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The position of a director in South African law: is it worth the risk? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For a very long time, our legal system recognised the board of directors of a company 
as the agents, who manage the affairs of the company for and on behalf of the 
shareholders.1 Previously, directors’ power and authority emanated from the founding 
documents of the company and were given to them by the shareholders.2 The 
introduction of the Companies Act of 2008, however, changed this legal position in that 
the Companies Act now gives the board of directors of a company an original power 
and authority to manage the affairs of the company.3 Previously, directors had a 
delegated authority and power to manage the affairs of the company from the 
shareholders, for and on behalf of the shareholders.4 
 
Section 66 of the Companies Act provides that the business and affairs of a company 
must be managed by or under the direction of its board, which has authority to exercise 
all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, except to the extent 
that the Act or the memorandum of incorporation (“MoI”) provides otherwise.5 It must 
be noted that the Companies Act specifically excludes a juristic person from being a 
director and provides that only natural persons may serve in the capacity of a director 
of a company.6 
 
The Companies Act now places more responsibilities and authority upon directors. Like 
the common law, the Companies Act continues to put more obligations and 
responsibilities upon directors and further exposes the directors to more liabilities with 
little protection and benefits from rogue shareholders. This position is more 
understandable when one considers the objective and purpose of the Companies Act. 
One of the main purposes of the Companies Act is inter alia, to balance the rights and 
                                                          
1 Letseng Diamonds Limited v JCI Ltd (21525/06) [2007] ZAGPHC 119 (28 June 2007). 
2 Delport and Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2017) (1st ed) 250(3). 
3 See s 66 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (herein referred to as the “Companies Act”). 
4 In terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the old act), the powers of directors were delegated to them by 
shareholders in terms of the Memorandum or Articles of Incorporation, See Delport and Vorster (n 2) 250(3). 
5 Westerhuis v Whittaker (4145/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 76 (26 April 2018) [(unreported)] par 18. 
6 s 69(7)(a) of the Companies Act. 
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obligations of shareholders and directors within the company and to encourage efficient 
and responsible management of companies.7 However, on a proper reading of the 
Companies Act, one can see that the main purpose of the Act is to protect the interests 
of the shareholders.8 The Companies Act gives no rights to the directors, bar the 
authority and power to manage the affairs of the company, whereas a plethora of rights 
and remedies are given to shareholders. It must be noted that such authority and power 
must be exercised for the benefit of the company and not for the benefit of the directors.9 
It is therefore common cause that a company is incorporated for the ultimate benefit of 
its shareholders. 
 
2. Problem statement 
 
An incorporated and registered company in terms of the South African law is a juristic 
person that exists separately from its management and shareholders.10 It is trite that, 
according to law, an incorporated company is treated like any other independent person, 
with his or her own rights and liabilities.11 However, even though a company has its 
own legal persona with rights and responsibilities, a company cannot act and or function 
on its own but rather acts through the agency of human beings, thus through the agency 
of a natural person with a body and soul. In fact, as said above the Companies Act 
specifically provides that only human beings can be the members of a board.12 
 
The foregoing factual and legal position raises a number of legal questions that will be 
dealt with in this dissertation. In particular, the dissertation will discuss and explore the 
role of a director, as well as the obligations, responsibilities and risk of liability or 
exposure to liability of directors in the South African legal system. In doing so, 
emphasis will be placed on the provisions of sections 22 and 76 read with sections 77 
and 218 of the Companies Act. In addition, the dissertation will pay attention to the 
provisions of section 162 of the Companies Act and the relevant case law decided by 
our courts over the years. However, in this regard a special attention will be given to 
                                                          
7 Van Tonder “Analysis of the directors’ duty to act in the best interest of the company, through the lens of the 
business judgement rule” 2015 Obiter 702 709; and s 7 of the Companies Act. 
8 s 7 of the Companies Act. 
9 s 66 of the Companies Act. 
10 Van Tonder (n 7) 702. 
11 Salomon v Salomon & Co 1897 AC 22 (HL). 
12 s 69(7) of the Companies Act. 
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Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others,13 a case dealing with section 
162(5)(c) of the Companies Act. This section entitles a court to declare a director a 
delinquent director or to place a director on probation. 
 
From the outset, it can be said that the main objective of the provisions of sections 22 
and 76, as read with sections 77, 162 and 218 of the Companies Act, is to provide 
protection to the company and its stakeholders, in particular shareholders, against 
directors who, in breach of their statutory and common law duties, have failed to 
manage the affairs of the company effectively and in accordance with the law. Van 
Tonder writes that another purpose of the Companies Act is to encourage efficient and 
responsible management of companies.14 The question is whether such a purpose would 
have the unintended consequence of being too harsh on directors to the extent that 
individuals might no longer find it appealing to become directors. 
 
In discussing the role and position of a director within the South African legal system, 
the dissertation will analyse the duties and responsibilities of directors. Furthermore, it 
will attempt to answer the question whether there is any benefit to being a director in 
light of the said duties, responsibilities and exposure to liability, as well as the 
possibility of being declared a delinquent director with its consequent ramifications. 
Therefore, the question that this dissertation seeks to answer is whether it is worth the 
risk of liability to be a director in terms of South African law. 
 
3. The definition and role of a director 
 
As mentioned above, the Companies Act projects a board of directors as the soul and 
mind of the company.15 In fact, it can be argued that without a board of directors there 
is no company. In terms of the Companies Act the board of directors has been assigned 
the legal duty and responsibility of managing the affairs of the company. It is common 
cause that before the passing of the Companies Act, the board of directors did not have 
original powers, but rather had derivative power and authority to manage the affairs 
                                                          
13 2016 2 All SA 649 (SCA). 
14 Van Tonder (n 7) 709. 
15 s 66 of the Companies Act. 
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and business of the company, which power and authority was delegated by the 
shareholders.16  
 
Since the power and authority of directors is derived from a piece of legislation, instead 
of the company’s formation or incorporation documents, such power and authority is 
now subject to less shareholder control.17 In fact, it can be argued that any provisions 
contained in the company’s founding documents that limit the power and authority 
conferred to the board by the Companies Act, may be unlawful and invalid.  
 
Some authors argue that the significance of the power to manage the business affairs of 
the company in terms of section 66 of the Companies Act is twofold. First, this power 
and authority is now original and not delegated by shareholders. Second, the ultimate 
power of the company now vests in the board of directors and not in the shareholders.18 
This may be true, but it is submitted that as long as the shareholders have the power to 
remove a director from the board at will,19 the provisions of section 66 will not have 
the much meaning.  
 
In light of the foregoing, it is critical to examine the meaning of “director” and the 
nature of the director’s relationship with the company. Who is a director of a company? 
The Companies Act defines a director as a member of the board of directors of a 
company, as contemplated in section 66, or an alternate director of the company, and 
includes any person occupying the position of a director or alternate director, by 
whatever name designated.20 It is important to note that in terms of this definition, the 
term “director” is expanded to include any person occupying the position of a director 
or an alternate director, by whatever name designated. One can fully agree with Cassim 
who writes that the definition of a director is too wide and that it matters not what a 
person calls himself, but what he does – this determines whether he is a director of the 
company.21 It is clear that  in this regard the Companies Act prefers substance over 
form. It is submitted that any person who controls or directs the affairs of the company, 
                                                          
16 Cassim Contemporary Company Law [2015] (2d ed) 403. 
17 Cassim (n 16) 461. 
18 Delport and Vorster (n 2) 250(3). 
19 s 71 of the Companies Act. 
20 s 1 of the Companies Act. 
21 Cassim (n 16) 404. 
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in terms of section 66 of the Companies Act, is sufficient to be considered a director. 
The test is objective. In order to determine whether a person is a director or not, the 
court will have to look at the facts of each case holistically. 
 
On the nature of the position of a director, Hanningan opines that a position of a director 
is similar to that of a fiduciary and that a fiduciary can be defined as someone who has 
undertaken to act for or on behalf of another person in a particular matter, which gives 
rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.22 In CyberScene Ltd v iKiosk Internet and 
Information,23 the court confirmed that a director stands in a fiduciary relationship with 
the company irrespective of whether such a director is an executive or non-executive 
director.  
 
It is important to note that a person only becomes a director of a company once such a 
person has been appointed or elected by the shareholders and such a person has 
delivered a written consent to the company to serve as a director.24 Registration as a 
director with the relevant government agency is irrelevant. The reason why such a 
person must give a consent to his or her appointment is because the common law and 
the Companies Act place extensive responsibilities on such a person, including 
exposure to possible liability in the event of failing to execute such responsibilities in 
accordance with the law. 
 
It is clear from the provisions of the Companies Act that the members of the board of 
directors are expected to function as a collective, because section 66 specifically assigns 
that power to the board.25 To this end, directors exercise their powers by passing 
resolutions in board meetings which are properly convened or through round-robin.26 
 
Having now dealt with the definition of a director, who qualifies as a director and the 
nature of such a relationship with the company, the discussion now turns to the duties 
and responsibilities of directors emanating from the Companies Act and common law. 
However, the purpose of this study is not to exhaustively deal with the duties and 
                                                          
22 Hannigan Company Law [2009] (2nd ed) 303. 
23 2000 3 SA 806 (C). 
24 s 66(7) of the Companies Act. 
25 Delport and Vorster (n 2) 250(2). 
26 Cassim (n 16) 462. 
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responsibilities of directors. The main aim is to answer the question whether it is worth 
the risk of liability to be a director. 
 
4. Common law and statutory duties and responsibilities of directors  
 
Cassim writes that the duties of directors are now derived from two sources, namely 
the Companies Act and the common law as found in the decisions of our courts.27  The 
Companies Act in terms of section 76 provides the standard for the conduct of directors 
– essentially setting out the duties of directors. In Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum Oil 
and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Ltd,28 Davis J mentioned that through a 
process of development, the common law has imposed a series of duties and 
responsibilities upon directors and these in essence include the following: 
 
(a) A set of fiduciary duties, that entail a duty to avoid conflict of interest, to act 
honestly, to promote the best interest of the company and not to usurp corporate 
opportunity, not to make secret profits and not to exercise power for other purposes; 
and 
 
(b) The duty of care, skill and diligence, which essentially amounts to the duty to 
manage the affairs of the company in the manner as it would be done by a reasonable 
prudent person of business. 
 
Section 76 of the Companies Act codified the aforesaid common law duties in that it 
provides that subject to subsections (4) and (5),29 a director of a company, when acting 
in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director (a) in 
good faith and for a proper purpose; (b) in the best interest of the company; and (c) with 
the degree of care, skill and diligence that may be expected of a person carrying the 
same function and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.30 
 
                                                          
27 Cassim (n 16) 475. 
28 2015 6 SA 338 (WCC). 
29 s 76(4) and 76(5) of the Companies Act provide a defence to directors, if complied with. 
30 s 76(3) of the Companies Act. 
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As said above, the Companies Act codified the common law fiduciary duties of 
directors with little emphasis or modification. Therefore, the common law that has 
developed over the years is still applicable and relevant when dealing with the question 
of duties and responsibilities of directors. Bouwman writes that the Companies Act 
provides for the partial codification of the duties of directors and as such the common 
law fiduciary duties are preserved. This partial codification creates a perfect balance as 
the common law and statutory duties now co-exist.31 
 
It is an accepted principle of our law that, as a general rule, directors owe their duties 
to the company as a whole and as a separate legal persona from its shareholders.32 In 
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and Another / Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd Margo J set out this 
principle when he held that a director is not a servant or agent of the shareholders but 
that of the company.33 
 
It is trite that the common law therefore remains the main source of the structure of our 
company law. The Companies Act rests upon this structure.34 In essence, when 
interpreting the Companies Act, our courts will heavily rely on the common law as 
developed by our courts. To this end, the discussion now turns to the fiduciary duty and 
duty of care, diligence and skill owed to the company by its directors as developed by 
the courts. 
 
4.1 Fiduciary Duties 
 
As a result of the nature of the relationship between a company and a director, known 
as a fiduciary relationship, the courts have developed a number of principles aimed at 
ensuring that the company’s interests are safeguarded against directors. As stated 
above, section 76 of the Companies Act codifies these fiduciary duties. Over the years 
the courts developed the common law fiduciary duties into two main categories, namely 
                                                          
31 Bouwman “An appraisal of the modification of the director’s duty of care and skill” 2009 SA Merc LJ 
509 511. 
32 Van Tonder (n 7) 712. 
33 1980 4 SA 156 (W). 
34 Fisheries Development Corporation case (n 33) par 61. 
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the corporate opportunity rule and the no profit rule. These principles are discussed 
below. 
 
4.2.1 Corporate opportunity rule 
 
In common law, and now in terms of the Companies Act, a director is prohibited from 
exploiting a corporate opportunity of the company.35 This means that, in terms of this 
corporate opportunity rule, a director cannot and must not use any information acquired 
as a director for his personal gain at the expense of the company. If an opportunity is 
for the benefit of the company, only the company can explore such an opportunity to a 
total exclusion of the director.  
 
In Da Silva v C H Chemicals (Pty) Ltd,36 the Supreme Court of Appeal explained the 
principle relating to the corporate opportunity rule and held that a consequence of the 
corporate opportunity rule is that in certain circumstances a director is obligated to 
acquire an economic opportunity for the company, if it is acquired at all, since such an 
opportunity is considered to be a corporate opportunity or a property of the company. 
 
In Robinson v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd,37 the appellate division held 
that a man in a fiduciary relationship is not allowed to place himself in a position where 
his own interest and his duties come into conflict. Margo J,38 held that the director is 
duty bound to observe the utmost good faith towards the company and in discharging 
such a duty he is required to exercise an independent judgement and must always act in 
the best interests of the company to the exclusion of the shareholders. In addition, it is 
a well-established principle of our law that a fiduciary, as a director, must always act in 
the best interest of the company. Flowing from this principle is the principle that such 
director must not place himself in a situation where his interests conflict with those of 
the beneficiary, in this instance a company.39 The Companies Act provides that a 
director must inform the board or shareholders of any personal financial interest he may 
                                                          
35 s 76(2)( a) of the Companies Act. 
36 2008 6 SA 620 (SCA) 19. 
37 1921 AD 168. 
38 Fisheries Development Corporation case (n 33). 
39 Havenga “Directors’ exploitation of corporate opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 2013 TSAR 
257. 
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have in a contract which is to be concluded by the company.40 On the other hand, section 
76(3) of the Companies Act specifically provides that a director, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform his functions in good faith and for a 
proper purpose in the best interest of the company.41 This principle has been part of our 
law for a long time as illustrated in Gundelfinger v African Textile Manufacturers (Pty) 
Ltd,42 wherein the court held that it is an elementary principle of company law that a 
director cannot vote for the adoption of a contract or on a matter in which he is an 
interested party. 
 
One can fully agree with Beuthin when he writes that in principle even an ordinary 
director, thus a non-executive director, whose only normal function will be to attend 
meetings, may be obliged to or be duty bound to transmit an opportunity to the company 
if such an opportunity is related to the business of the company.43 Arguably, the 
underlying principle is that, where there is a conflict, the company must benefit and not 
the director, otherwise the director will be in breach of his duty to avoid a conflict of 
interest.  
 
4.2.2 No profit rule 
 
The Companies Act provides that a director must not use his position, or any 
information obtained while acting in the capacity of a director to gain a personal 
advantage, or an advantage for another person other than the company.44 This statutory 
duty is nothing new, but is a well-established principle of our common law and 
confirmed through case law. Our law has a plethora of cases wherein profits made by 
directors, in such capacities, and in the course of their office, has been declared profits 
of the companies in question. The no profit rule even applies in instances where the 
company could not even prove that the company was to make such a profit.45 
 
                                                          
40 s 75 of the Companies Act. 
41 s 76(3)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act. 
42 1939 AD 314. 
43 Beuthin “Corporate opportunity and non-profit rule” 1978 SALJ 458 470. 
44 s 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act. 
45 Cassim “Da Silva v C H Chemicals (Pty) Ltd: fiduciary duties of resigning directors” 2009 SALJ 61 64. 
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In Da Silva v C H Chemicals the Supreme Court of Appeal was concerned with 
disgorgement of profits, or alternatively payment of damages, arising from an alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty by a director of the company.46 Scott JA held that it is a well-
established principle of our law that directors have a fiduciary duty to exercise their 
powers in good faith and in the best interest of the company. He then concluded that 
directors may not make secret profits or otherwise place themselves in a position where 
their fiduciary duty conflicts with their personal interest. It is an accepted legal principle 
that once an opportunity amounts to a corporate opportunity it is no defence that the 
company could not have taken the corporate opportunity, the opportunity remains that 
of the company and as such a director will be held liable.47 
 
In Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd,48 the Supreme Court of Appeal was concerned 
with the liability of an employee to his employer for secret profits made out of an 
opportunity arising from the course of his employment. The court, in finding the 
employee liable, equated his position to that of a director. 
 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the law favours a company over a director in 
instances where the interests of the two are in conflict. This position is understandable 
when one considers the fact that a company cannot fight for its own rights but can only 
do so through the agency of human beings, in particular directors in terms of section 66 
of the Companies Act. At all times our law tries to protect the vulnerable. 
 
4.2 Duty of care, skill and diligence 
 
Section 76(3) of the Companies Act partially codifies the common law duty of care, 
skill and diligence in that it provides that a director of a company, when acting as such, 
is duty bound to exercise such powers and perform such functions as a director with the 
degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person in his 
position with the knowledge, skill and experience of that director. The duty of care, 
                                                          
46 2008 6 SA 620 (SCA). 
47 Da Silva case (n 46) above par 19. 
48 2004 1 All SA 150 (SCA). 
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skill and diligence is not a fiduciary duty, but can rather be seen as one which is based 
on delictual or Aquilian liability for negligence on the part of the director.49 
 
In Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd,50 the court laid down three 
principles governing the duty of care, skill and diligence on the part of the director: 
 
1. A director need not exhibit a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be 
expected from a person of his or her knowledge and experience. This means that a 
director is expected to exercise the care and apply the skill that can reasonably be 
expected of a person with his or her knowledge or expertise;  
 
2. A director is not required to give a company his full-time attention to the running 
of the company’s affairs. As argued above, the duties of a director are performed at 
board meetings. This means that there is a difference between a full-time executive 
director, who is engaged in the day to day management of the company, and a non-
executive director who has not undertaken any special obligations; 
 
3. A director, in the absence of grounds for suspicion, is justified in trusting an official 
to perform such duties honestly. However, a director exercising reasonable care 
would not accept information and advice blindly, but rather he or she should accept 
it and rely on it provided he or she has given it due consideration and he or she has 
exercised his or her own judgement. 
 
It is therefore clear that in respect of the duty of care, skill and diligence an objective 
test is applied to determine what the reasonable director would have done in the same 
situation, as well as a subjective test which takes into account the general knowledge, 
skill and experience of the specific director.51 A director is therefore expected to act 
reasonably in performing his duties as a director vis a vis the company. 
 
                                                          
49 Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 3 SA 71 (T); Du Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 4 SA 165 
(C). 
50 1980 4 SA 156 (W). 
51 Delport and Vorster (n 2) 298(7). 
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5. Liability of directors in terms of section 77 read with section 22 of the Companies Act 
and the common law 
 
Having reviewed the nature and extent of duties and responsibilities of directors of the 
company, the discussion now turns to deal with the liability of directors under the 
Companies Act and the common law. It is clear that failure to adhere to the duties and 
responsibilities of directors as set out above, may attract liability on the part of a 
director. For purposes if this study, the focus will be on the legislative provisions, in 
particular section 77 of the Companies Act, and case law which deals with civil liability 
of directors.  
 
In terms of the Companies Act, a director of a company shall be liable in accordance 
with the principles of common law relating to breach of fiduciary duty, for loss, 
damages or costs sustained by the company as a result of a breach by the director of a 
duty of care, skill and diligence in terms of section 76(3)(c),52 losses due to a breach of 
a provision of the Companies Act not mentioned in section 77, and losses due to the 
contravention of any provisions of the memorandum of incorporation (MoI) of the 
company. In addition, section 77(2) (a) of the Companies Act provides for liability in 
terms of the principles of common law relating to a breach of a fiduciary duty, for any 
loss, damage or cost sustained by the company as a consequence of any breach by the 
director of a duty contemplated in section 76(2) and 76(3) (a) or (b). 
 
The Companies Act imposes an obligation on our courts, when determining matters 
brought to them in terms of the Companies Act, to develop the common law where 
necessary to improve the realisation and enjoyment of the rights emanating from the 
Companies Act.53 Therefore, in dealing with a case in terms of which a party seeks 
damages against the director in terms of the foregoing legislative provisions, our courts 
shall rely heavily on the case law developed over the years.  
 
In the Fisheries Development case referred to above, the court held that the extent of 
the duty of skill and care of directors depends on the nature of the business of the 
                                                          
52 s 77(2)(b) of the Companies Act. 
53 s 158 of the Companies Act. 
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company and the law does not require the director to have any special business acumen. 
The court went on and held that the test for recklessness was an objective one in that a 
director’s actions are measured against the standard conduct of a rational reasonable 
person. However, it is also subjective in that a court has to postulate that a rational 
director as belonging to the same group or class as the director in question and having 
the same knowledge and means.54  
 
It is an accepted principle of our law that a director owes his fiduciary duties and duty 
of care and skill to the company and, as such, it is the company that may sue the director 
for breach of such duties, unless the legislation provides otherwise.55 A director of a 
company who fails to observe his duty of care and skill will be liable to the company 
for any loss suffered as a result of such failure. This liability will be based on either 
delict or contract.56  
 
Having said the foregoing, section 218(2) of the Companies Act, however, states that 
any person who contravenes any provision of the Companies Act is liable to any other 
person for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of that contravention. 
It appears from section 218 of the Companies Act that a creditor, or any other person 
who suffers as a result of the contravention, will have a claim against a director who 
breached the provisions of the Companies Act.57 Section 218 of the Companies Act 
therefore broadens the scope of persons who have recourse against a director who 
contravenes the provisions of the Act. Cassim rightly notes that section 218 of the 
Companies Act, like section 22 which supplements the common law remedies against 
directors of a company, supplements section 77 of the Companies Act and broadens the 
scope of liability of directors.58 
 
In terms of the common law, a director of a company has two duties – fiduciary duties 
and duties of skill and care. In the case of fiduciary duties, fault is not a requirement for 
liability. This is therefore a form of strict liability.59 The duty of care and skill, however, 
                                                          
54 Bekink “A historical overview of the director’s duty of care and skill: from the nineteenth century to the 
Companies Bill of 2007” 2008 SAMercLJ 95 101. 
55 Hanningan Company Law (2009) 301.  
56 Bekink (n 54) 101.  
57 Rabinowitz v Van Graan 2013 5 SA 315 (GSJ). 
58 Cassim (n 16) 582. 
59 Stevens “The duty of care and skill and reckless trading: remedies in flux?” 2016 SAMercLJ 250. 
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requires fault for liability – which means that all delictual elements have to be proven 
in such cases.60 The plaintiff and/or applicant in such instances will therefore have to 
prove conduct and fault in the form of negligence or intention. It appears that the 
Companies Act has not changed this legal position. The next paragraph considers the 
provisions of section 77 of the Companies Act. 
 
Section 77(2)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act specifically provide that a director of a 
company may be held liable in accordance with the principles of the common law 
relating to breach of fiduciary duty and duty of care, skill and diligence. It is interesting 
to note that the Companies Act equally provides for strict liability for breach of 
statutory fiduciary duties and delictual liability for a breach of the duty of care and skill.  
 
Van der Linde writes that, despite the fact that a director was merely executing his 
function on behalf of the company, acting entirely in pursuit of company business, the 
law of delict has no difficulty in attributing the conduct of the director for purposes of 
imposing personal liability.61 The Companies Act provides that such a director may be 
held liable in delict for a breach of the duty of care and skill. Negligence must however 
be proven in such a case. The Companies Act further makes it clear that a director is 
jointly and severally liable with any other person who is or may be held liable for the 
same act.62 
 
In addition to liability of directors based on a breach of their duties, section 77(3)(b) 
read with subsection (c) of the Companies Act states that any director of a company is 
liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect 
consequence of the director having agreed to the carrying on of the company’s business 
despite knowing that it was being conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1) of 
the Companies Act63 or being party to an act or omission by the company despite 
knowing that the act or omission was calculated to defraud a company creditor, 
employee or shareholder, or had another fraudulent purpose. 
 
                                                          
60 Stevens (n 59) 250. 
61 Van der Linde “The personal liability of directors for corporate fault-exploration” 2008 SAMercLJ 439 450. 
62 s 77(8) of the Companies Act. 
63 Section 22(1) of the Act states that a company must not carry on its business recklessly, with gross 
negligence, with intent to defraud any person, or for any fraudulent purpose. 
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Section 22(1) of the Companies Act states that a company must not carry on its business 
recklessly, with gross negligence, with the intent to defraud any person, or for any 
fraudulent purpose. Cassim writes that for liability to arise from the contravention of 
section 22 of the Companies Act, the business of the company must have been carried 
on fraudulently or recklessly or with gross negligence to the knowledge of the 
wrongdoer.64 In this instance a director becomes liable, not for his conduct, but for 
failure to stop a company from violating the provisions of section 22. Section 77(3)(b) 
read with section 22, therefore, places a positive obligation on the part of a director. As 
said above, a company acts through its board of directors. If a director wants to avoid 
liability for violation of section 22, the director has to show that he or she disassociated 
himself or herself from the reckless trading, upon failure of which liability will follow. 
Unfortunately, the Companies Act does not provide protection for such a director from 
being removed from the board of directors by co-directors of the board.65 
 
It is interesting to observe that the foregoing legal principles suggest that a director 
must put the interest of a company above his or her own interests, even in instances 
where he or she is not an executive director, as long as there is a potential conflict. This 
may pose problems of liability for conflict of interest for some entrepreneurs who are 
exposed to big corporations and are invited to sit on their boards. 
 
It must be emphasised that, in addition to civil claims, there is a possibility of criminal 
prosecution under the criminal law, where the director is at fault or has breached his 
duties as a director.66 In fact, section 214 of the Companies Act provides for criminal 
liability if an act of fraud has been perpetrated by any person in relation to a company, 
its creditors or employees. However, for purposes of this study, criminal liability will 
not be discussed. Having considered the obligations on the part of a director and 
consequent liability for failure to execute the obligations in terms of the Companies Act 
and the common law, the discussion now turns to the provisions of section 162 of the 
Companies Act and the leading case in this regard. 
 
 
                                                          
64 Cassim (n 16) 588. 
65 See section 71 of the Companies Act that deals with removal of directors by fellow directors. 
66 Hannigan (n 55) 302 
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6. Section 162 of the Companies Act and Gihwala v Grancy Property Ltd 
 
In addition to the provisions of section 77 of the Companies Act, which deals with 
liability of directors, section 162 of the Companies Act introduced the new concept of 
“director delinquency” and “probation” in our law. The old Companies Act only gave 
our courts the power to make an order for a director’s disqualification. For purposes of 
this study, attention will be given to the provisions of the Companies Act that deals 
with declaring directors delinquent and the consequences of such an order for directors. 
The provisions of the Companies Act dealing with probation will not be considered. In 
addressing the question of declaring a director delinquent in terms of section 162 of the 
Act, the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Gihwala v Grancy 
Property Ltd will be considered.67 
 
There is no doubt that in developing the company law, whether through common law 
or legislation, the main aim is to protect shareholders and stakeholders of the company, 
including but not limited to employees and creditors. This position was articulated well 
by Davis J when he said that corporate governance is a legal concept of which is to 
ensure net gains in wealth for shareholders, protect the legitimate concerns of other 
stakeholders and improve efficiency, organisation performance and resource 
management.68 
 
6.1 The facts of the Gihwala v Grancy Property Ltd case 
 
In Gihwala v Grancy Property Ltd, the Supreme Court of Appeal was called upon to 
overturn an order granted by the court a quo declaring two of the directors of the 
company delinquent in terms of section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.69 For purposes 
of this study, only the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal will be considered in 
so far as it deals with the declaration of delinquency in terms of section 162 of the 
Companies Act. The Supreme Court of Appeal was called upon to consider an appeal 
against a decision of Fourie J, sitting as the court of first instance, wherein he dismissed 
                                                          
67 Gihwala case (n 13). 
68 See Mthimunye-Bakoro case (n 28). 
69 Gihwala case (n 13) par 3-4. 
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the constitutional challenge to section 162 of the Companies Act and declared Gihwala 
and Manala delinquent directors.70 
 
Briefly, the facts of this case are clear and specific and can be summarized as follows: 
Grancy Property Limited (respondent) and Messrs Gihwala and Manala (appellants) 
entered into and concluded an investment agreement. In terms of the investment 
agreement the parties had agreed to invest their monies in a special purpose company 
called SIM, which in return invested its funds in Ngatana Property Investment (Pty) Ltd 
(“Ngatana”), which was a special purpose vehicle incorporated for purposes of 
implementing a Black Economic Empowerment transaction with Spearhead Property 
Fund.71 
 
The appellants were in turn appointed as directors of SIM. Unfortunately, at the time 
when the investment had matured and dividends had flown from Spearhead Property 
Fund to Ngatana and ultimately to SIM, a dispute arouse between the appellants and 
the respondents.72 The dispute arose because the appellants channelled millions of rands 
from SIM to their companies in clear disregard of corporate governance and at the 
expense of the respondent.73 To this end, the respondent instituted a number of cases 
wherein it sought various forms of relief. A number of interim orders were granted but 
SIM and appellants did not comply with these orders. As a result, the matter discussed 
herein was instituted. 
 
6.2 The legal position as set out in Gihwala v Grancy Property Ltd 
 
Section 162(5) of the Companies Act lists a number of grounds, upon being proven, a 
court must make an order declaring a person a delinquent director. For purposes of this 
study, only the provisions of section 162(5)(b) will be considered. This section provides 
for declarations of delinquency on grounds that this study terms substantive abuses of 
office and misconduct by directors. These grounds include, but are not limited to, the 
following – if the person: 
                                                          
70 Gihwala case (n 13) par 3. 
71 Gihwala case (n 13) par 5-13. 
72 Gihwala case (n 13) par 20-28. 
73 Gihwala case (n 13) par 23. 
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(b) While a director: 
 
(i) grossly abused the position of a director;  
 
(ii) took personal advantage of information or an opportunity that should have been 
disclosed or offered to the company, or intentionally, or by gross negligence, 
inflicted harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the company; 
 
(iii) acted in a manner that amounts to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach 
of the trust relationship in relation to the performance of his functions and duties 
as a director of the company; 
 
(iv) acted in the name of the company, signed anything on behalf of the company, 
or purported to bind the company or authorise the taking of any action by or on 
behalf of the company, despite knowing that he lacked the necessary authority; 
 
(v) acquiesced to the carrying on of the company’s business, despite knowing that 
it was being conducted in a manner that constituted reckless trading; or 
 
(vi) had been a party to an act or omission by the company, despite knowing that the 
act or omission was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder 
of the company, or had another fraudulent purpose.74 
 
It is clear that the grounds for declaring a person a delinquent director entail dishonesty, 
wilful misconduct or gross negligence. It is submitted that the grounds for declaring a 
person a delinquent director for any form of negligence may be too wide. The 
legislature was perhaps too harsh in this regard. This position may restrict directors in 
performing their functions for fear of being declared delinquent directors. 
 
On reading the foregoing provisions, it becomes clear that once the grounds listed in 
section 162(5) of the Companies Act are established, the court has no discretion but 
                                                          
74 These provisions are basically a clear codification of the common law fiduciaries duties of directors and now 
beach thereof does not only attract personal liability but can also lead to one being declared a delinquent director 
with subsequent consequences. 
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must grant an order declaring a director a delinquent. In Gihwala v Grancy Property 
Ltd, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of section 162(5) arguing that the 
provision does not give the court a discretion in granting a delinquency order and as 
such, it fell foul of the constitutional right to dignity, the right to choose a trade, 
occupation or profession and the right of access to courts.75  
 
It is interesting to note how quick the Supreme Court of Appeal was in inferring tacit 
terms in the investment contract – in particular that the appellants owed duties of good 
faith and fair dealing to the respondent and that the appellants were precluded from 
enriching themselves at the expense of the respondent by charging SIM fees to which 
the respondent had not consented. This clearly demonstrates that directors are going to 
be held to a high standard of accountability and transparency, or face the legal 
consequences.  
 
In dealing with this constitutional challenge the Supreme Court of Appeal maintained 
that in order to assess the matter, one had to examine the purpose of section 165(5) of 
the Companies Act. The court further held that the purpose of section 165 is not penal 
in nature, but is aimed at protecting the investing public against the type of conduct that 
leads to an order of delinquency, as well as to protect those who deal with companies 
against the misconduct of delinquent directors.76 This principle was also laid down in 
Msimang NO and Another v Katuliba and Others.77 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed the constitutional challenge, 
opining that section 162(5) of the Companies Act is not an irrational response to the 
challenges faced by society regarding delinquent directors.78 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal went on to find that section 162 of the Companies Act is patently an appropriate 
and proportionate response by the lawmaker to the problem of delinquent directors and 
the harm that they may cause to the public who put trust in them.79  
 
                                                          
75 Gihwala case (n 13) par 141. 
76 Gihwala case (n 13) par 142. 
77 2013 All SA 580 (GSJ) par 29. 
78 Gihwala case (n 13) par 145. 
79 Gihwala case (n 13) par 145. 
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Turning to the grounds and/or requirements of section 162(5) of the Companies Act, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that, regarding the ground of gross abuse of the 
position of a director, we are not talking about a trivial misdemeanour or an 
unfortunately fall from grace but a gross abuse of a position of a director. The second 
ground entails taking personal advantage of information or an opportunity available 
because of the person’s position as a director. The third ground entails circumstances 
where a director has intentionally or by gross negligence inflicted harm upon the 
company, while the fourth ground is where a director has been guilty of gross 
negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in relation of performance of his duties 
as a director. The Supreme Court of Appeal correctly concluded that our law has 
denounced that for over a century.80   
 
It is interesting to note that despite the provisions of the Companies Act, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that it must be borne in mind that a delinquency order can only 
be made in consequences of serious misconduct on the part of the director. The question 
is whether gross negligence amounts to serious misconduct. This study submits that 
negligence will not necessarily amount to serious misconduct. Put differently, bad 
business decisions will not necessarily suffice for the order to be granted, since this 
amounts to ordinary negligence. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that a director must seek guidance from and comply with the well-
established common law principles of fiduciary duties and duty the of care and skill of 
directors in order to avoid being declared a delinquent director. The Companies Act did 
not necessarily introduce a new covenant in this regard, but rather additional 
consequences of violating well and long established legal principles. 
 
6.3 The effect of being declared a delinquent director 
 
The consequences of being declared a delinquent director are serious and may have far- 
reaching implications. A person who is so declared is disqualified from being a director 
of a company for a period of at least seven years, unless such a person makes an 
application to a court for an order allowing him to serve as a director upon certain 
                                                          
80 Gihwala case (n 13) par 143. 
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conditions.81 This may mean a person is not in a position to earn a living for a period 
of seven years. This may have dire consequences for those who are running family 
businesses and rely on such business for their survival. It is common knowledge that 
litigation is expensive, to the extent that the majority of South Africans do not have 
access to courts. It is submitted that the legislature should possibly have devised a 
different means of challenging an order of delinquency as opposed to applying to court. 
 
In addition to declaring a person a delinquent director, the court may order that so such 
director pay compensation to any person who was adversely affected by the delinquent 
director’s conduct, to the extent that such a victim does not have a legal recourse to 
claim compensation.82  
 
7. Removal of directors in terms of section 71 of the Companies Act 
 
As discussed above, it is an accepted principle of our law that directors owe their duty 
of loyalty to the company and that they must at all times act in the best interests of the 
company. This position is now entrenched in the Companies Act.83 However, for some 
odd reason, the Companies Act still gives the shareholders the right to remove a director 
by a simple majority resolution without even furnishing grounds or reasons for such a 
removal.84 In addition, the Companies Act provides two other methods of removing 
directors, namely by board resolution and by the Companies Tribunal.85 
 
In Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum and Oil Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Limited 
and Another,86 in dismissing an application to set aside resolutions passed by the  
respondents, Davis J held that directors, such as the applicants (the CEO and CFO of 
the company), would be barred from participating in the board meeting dealing with 
their suspension.. The court held that  reputation damage and the potential damage to 
their future with company were sufficient to constitute the required financial interest 
under section 75(5) of the Companies Act and would moreover, also bar them from 
                                                          
81 s 162(6) of the Companies Act.  
82 s 162(10)(c) of the Companies Act. 
83 s 76 of the Companies Act. 
84 s 71 of the Companies Act. 
85 See s 71(3) of the Companies Act; and Ncube “You are fired! The removal of a director under the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008” 2011 SALJ 33 37. 
86 2015 6 SA 338 (WCC). 
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participating under the common law.87 This case was distinguished from that of SABC 
v Mpofu,88 wherein the court laid down the fundamental principle that a meeting of a 
board of directors would be invalid and unlawful where a director has been excluded 
from full participation therein, save where the exclusion could be shown to be justified. 
 
The Companies Act provides for the removal of a director by the shareholders in a 
properly convened shareholders’ meeting. In addition, the Companies Act provides for 
the removal of a director by the board or by a tribunal in certain circumstances. The 
critical difference between the power to remove a director that is vested in the 
shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting and the power to remove a director that is 
vested in the board of directors or a Company Tribunal, is that the shareholders can 
remove a director from office for any reason, or for no reason at all – the shareholders 
can simply vote on the resolution as they see fit. Whereas, the board or Company 
Tribunal cannot exercise its power to remove a director unless one of the listed statutory 
grounds is present.  
 
Ncube writes that, whilst the removal proceedings are initiated on the basis of 
allegations, a director will be dismissed if the allegations are substantiated to the 
satisfaction of the board or the Companies Tribunal.89 It is important to note that the 
existence of the alleged grounds, as found by the board and relied on in its removal of 
a director, may be contested by the director in question and the act explicitly gives the 
court the power to review the decision of the board in this regard.90 On the other hand, 
the decision to remove a director by the shareholders’ resolution appears to be 
sacrosanct in that it can only be challenged on procedural grounds and not on 
substantive grounds, as it is the case with the removal of director by the board of 
directors or a Company Tribunal. Once again, the Companies Act is giving the 
shareholders an upper-hand despite specially declaring that the board is responsible for 
the management of the affairs of the company to the exclusion of shareholders. 
 
                                                          
87 Mthimunye-Bakoro case par 50-65. 
88 SABC v Mpofu [2009] 4 All SA 169 (GSJ). 
89 Ncube (n 85) 40. 
90 s 71(5) and (9) of the Companies Act. 
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In Butler v Van Zyl,91 the majority of the shareholders had directed a written and signed 
demand to the company to convene a shareholders’ meeting for two purposes, the first 
being to remove a certain respondent as director and the second to appoint or confirm 
the appointment as director of a certain Mkhwanazi. In this case the respondent made 
an urgent application to the high court for an order interdicting the holding of the 
proposed shareholders’ meeting to vote on his removal as a director. In the court a quo, 
the respondent successfully invoked an interdict previously granted by a different 
division of the high court, the North-West High Court, in proceedings instituted by a 
different litigant (a shareholder) in the context of an entirely different dispute between 
that litigant and the company. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
earlier interdict did not bar the majority of the shareholders in the present case from 
demanding the convening of a shareholders’ meeting to vote on the removal of the 
respondent as a director.92 
 
It is now an established principle of our law that the shareholders in a properly convened 
shareholders’ meeting have an absolute and sacrosanct right to remove a director from 
office at any time without giving reasons, whereas a board decision for a director’s 
removal must be based on the limited statutory grounds.93 It is further an established 
principle that the board resolution to remove the director can thereafter be taken to court 
on review by the aggrieved director.94 
 
In Steenkamp and Another v The Central Energy Fund SOC Ltd and Another,95 the 
applicants contended that they were unlawfully removed as directors in terms of the 
Companies Act. In this matter the sole shareholder requested the board of its subsidiary 
company to convene a general meeting in terms of section 71 of the Companies Act, 
not less than 15 days later and to circulate to every board member a letter addressed to 
them by the majority shareholder’s board requesting reasons why they should not be 
removed as directors of the subsidiary company. In that letter the shareholder expressed 
its concern about the “strategic direction and the financial standing and management of 
                                                          
91 (554/13) [2014] ZASCA 81 (30 May 2014). 
92 Butler case (n 91) par 19 and 21. 
93 s 71(3) of the Companies Act. 
94 s 71(5) of the Companies Act. 
95(13599/2017) [2017] ZAWCHC 107; 2018 1 SA 311 (WCC) (22 September 2017). 
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the subsidiary” and outlined some of its main concerns. The court held that it would 
also appear that the shareholders of a company, acting through a shareholders’ meeting, 
have a wider discretion or power to remove directors than does the company itself 
acting through its board of directors. In the case of the board, it would appear to be a 
requirement for the removal of a director that he or she has become ineligible in terms 
of section 69 of the Companies Act, or disqualified or incapacitated or has neglected or 
been derelict in the performance of his or her functions as a director.96 Section 71(3) of 
the Companies Act, however, is not directly applicable to shareholders acting through 
a shareholders’ meeting as provided by section 71(1) and (2). Be that as it may, there 
will obviously be cases where the shareholders are of the view, for example, that a 
director has neglected or been derelict in the performance of his or her functions as a 
director and that this provides grounds for his or her removal.  
 
The decisions of our courts in the above cases illustrate that a director who no longer 
enjoys the support and favour of shareholders having a voting majority, has no choice 
but to accept the inevitability of his removal from office. This is true unless the director 
can find some legal basis for preventing the shareholders from holding the requisite 
meeting or for preventing the majority shareholders from voting their shares on a 
resolution for his removal. In other words, his only basis for challenge will be on 
procedural grounds. 
 
8. Remuneration of directors 
 
Having discussed the duties of directors, their exposure to liability and the grounds for 
their removal from office, the study now considers if there is any legislative benefit of 
being a director. The question that then arises is whether a remuneration of a director 
is a legal entitlement or a privilege. In terms of section 66 (9) of the Companies Act, 
for remuneration to be paid, the shareholders must have passed a special resolution 
within the previous two years. This condition means that the proposed resolution must 
have more support than was previously required.97   
 
                                                          
96 Steenkamp case (n 95) par 36. 
97 Under the old Companies Act a simple majority was sufficient. 
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It should be noted that under the old Companies Act and the common law, when a 
person was appointed as a director he or she did not consequentially become entitled to 
remuneration by virtue of such an appointment.98 It appears that this position is still the 
same even under the new Companies Act, because directors’ remuneration needs to be 
discussed and agreed upon by passing a special resolution. The Companies Act provides 
that the company may pay remuneration to its directors for their services as directors.99 
Regarding the payment of remuneration, the provisions of the Companies Act are not 
mandatory, meaning that the shareholders have a discretion to decide whether to 
remunerate the directors. 
 
In light of the Companies Act, we can therefore have a situation whereby a director is 
forced to resign his position because the special resolution which was passed two years 
ago has expired and the shareholders are refusing to pass another with favourable terms 
for a director. It is therefore submitted that the current legal position on remuneration 
of directors can be abused to victimise a director in instances where a director sticks to 
the provisions of section 66 of the Companies Act to the dislike of the shareholders. In 
instances where a director resigns based on the lack of a resolution on remuneration, a 
director will not have recourse against the company, whereas if he is removed he may 
have a civil claim. 
 
9. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
Having considered the position of the director within our legal system, it is clear that 
even though the position or role of a director is a vital one within a company structure, 
the position is also a delicate one, which can expose directors to far-reaching legal 
consequences. It cannot be emphasised enough that without a board, there is no 
company. The company functions through its board of directors – being a body of 
directors functioning collectively.  
 
In addition to being liable for breaching his duties, it is unfortunate that a director may 
be found liable for agreeing or acquiescing to a company trading in violation of section 
                                                          
98 Brown v Nanco (Pty) Ltd 1976 3 SA 832 (W). 
99 s 66(8) of the Companies Act. 
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22 of the Companies Act. This is the case even if a majority of the board members 
allowed it to happen. In this instance, a director becomes liable for allowing the 
company to trade recklessly and as such is liable for the actions of the company. One 
can imagine the consequences to be suffered by a director who objects to the majority 
of the members of the board who, for one reason and other, are intent on allowing a 
company to trade recklessly. It is submitted that such a director may be removed by his 
or her fellow directors. A director in those circumstances will be in an unfortunate 
position, having to choose between what may be his livelihood and the risk of exposure 
to liability. In the circumstances, a position of a director needs to be revisited with the 
aim of amending the law and giving more protection to directors from being removed 
for objecting to the company trading recklessly.  
 
In addition to the foregoing, it is submitted that directors must not be held liable for the 
actions of the company, in particular for trading recklessly. There is a thin line between 
taking a business risk and being reckless. It is common cause that there are many things 
entrepreneurs could have done differently with the benefit of hindsight. Entrepreneurs 
by their nature are risk takers. Attaching liability in such instances, like an armchair 
critic with the benefit of hindsight, is unfortunate – more so when directors are alleged 
to have acted recklessly in pursuit of business objectives. To this end, legislative reform 
is suggested. Directors should not be held liable for the conduct of the company. 
 
It is clear that the legal framework in South Africa is increasingly attempting to hold 
directors liable in their personal capacity for actions of the company. To this end, it is 
only fair that an individual be given the opportunity to weigh up any risks against the 
rewards for serving as a director. Unfortunately, it can be argued that the law, in 
particular the Companies Act, is aimed at protecting all company stakeholders with the 
exception of directors. In addition, despite the huge responsibility of directors towards 
the company, directors can be removed from office by an ordinary resolution of 
shareholders without any valid reason. Furthermore, directors can be removed by fellow 
directors, albeit on certain grounds. It is submitted that directors who hold majority 
votes can abuse this right in instances where they disagree with their fellow directors. 
The same can be said for shareholders who may abuse their legislative power to remove 
directors. This can also occur in state owned enterprises which operate in a seriously 
politicised environment. This position is equally unfortunate – once appointed, it should 
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not be possible to remove directors at will, so that they are able to execute their duties 
and functions without fear and favour. To this end, it is proposed that perhaps a 
Company Tribunal be tasked with the removal of directors, as an independent body. 
 
It must be remembered that, in addition to being liable for damages suffered as result 
of failure to execute the duties as a director as required in terms common and statutory 
law, a director may be declared a delinquent director with the consequence of being 
barred from appointment as a director for a period of seven years. It appears that the 
legislature was providing a preventive measure against rogue directors. However, it 
may be pointed out that such a deterrent does not exist in other professions. Therefore, 
it is submitted that the lawmaker went too far in this instance. We may lose brilliant 
persons as directors just because they made one silly mistake, and such persons may be 
lost in the system for a period of seven years. Even though a director may be declared 
a delinquent, the court should be given a discretion to decide on the number of years 
during which a delinquent director may not be allowed to serve as a director. 
 
While one may agree with Bekink that the title of “director” is highly valued by many 
people in our society and is seen as eminent and prestigious, it is better for one to be a 
director of his own company, thus a shareholder-director, as opposed to be a normal 
director in a big corporation, in light of the many duties and possible exposure to 
liability.100 Prestige is not worth the price to be paid in cases where liability follows. 
The position of directors is worsened by the fact that they are not entitled to 
remuneration by law. The position of a director is therefore one with exposure to 
liability with no legal benefits. It is therefore submitted that it is not worth the liability 
to be a director in terms of South African law. Therefore, exposing directors to a high 
risk of liability may be a noble legal idea for the protection of company stakeholders 
but this noble idea has many unwarranted and unintended consequences. This serves as 
a deterrent to persons for serving on boards of directors. Having acknowledged the 
importance of the duties of directors and consequences of failing to adhere to those 
duties, the study concludes that the law has exposed directors to too much liability and, 
as such, legislative reform should be considered in order to remedy this legislative 
overreach. 
                                                          
100 Bekink (n 54) 110. 
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